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Reinventing Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Michael Ridge
I offer new arguments for an unorthodox reading of J. L.
Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right andWrong, one onwhichMackie
does not think all substantive moral claims are false, but al-
lows that a proper subset of them are true. Further, those that
are true should be understood in terms of a “hybrid theory”.
The proposed reading is one on which Mackie is a conceptual
pruner, arguing that we should prune away error-ridden moral
claims but hold onto those already free of error. This reading is
very different from the standard ones found in the literature. I
build on recent work by Moberger and argue that this reading
is better corroborated by close attention to the way in which
Mackie argues at length that terms like “good” and “ought”
are systematically context-sensitive, as well as by considerable
additional textual evidence. This reading, however, faces an im-
portant challenge—to explain in what sense, if any, morality
retains its “normativity” on the proposed reading. I argue that
this challenge can bemet, at least given some ofMackie’s further
assumptions about the nature of rationality.
Reinventing Ethics: Inventing Right and
Wrong
Michael Ridge
Chapter one of J. L. Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
is part of the “canon” of modern metaethics, appearing on any
Introduction to Metaethics syllabus worth its salt. The orthodox
reading has Mackie offering a powerful battery of arguments
for the “moral error theory”, according to which all substantive
moral claims are untrue. Ordinary moral judgments, Mackie is
taken to argue, commit us to an ontologically “queer” kind of ob-
jective value for which a plausible epistemology is problematic.
Moreover, Mackie argues, such an objectivist interpretation of
our moral practice does not fit well with the kind of widespread
moral disagreement within and between communities. A better
explanation is that our judgments involve a kind of projective fal-
lacy, whereby in Humean fashion we “gild and stain” the world
with our sentiments, taking what are really our subjective re-
actions to be objective features in the world. These arguments
influenced generations of future self-styled error theorists, who
typically take Mackie’s work as their jumping off point.1
There is an elephant in the room, though. The rest of Mackie’s
book does not sit comfortablywith the orthodox reading of chap-
ter one. After supposedly having argued that all of morality is
bunk, Mackie goes on to defend a number of substantive moral
claims. On the standard reading of chapter one, this flagrantly
contradicts chapter one. As one commentator put it, it would
1I do not mean to suggest, of course, that Mackie is the first philosopher
to defend (or be taken to defend, anyway) an error theory of this sort. Moral
nihilism has a rich and storied history in philosophy, one which I cannot
even usefully summarize here. The point remains, though, that contemporary
discussions of the error theory take Mackie’s work as canonical. For a useful
discussion of the broader history, see Olson (2014).
be as if someone argued that “astrology is all the rankest, most
hopeless nonsense, only to go on, in Part II, to argue that you can
never trust Librans” (Lenman 2013, 399).
Somewhat scandalously, discussions of Mackie often ignore
this apparently glaring contradiction. The few commentators
who have discussed the issue have tried to resolve the contra-
diction in one of two main ways: either by reading Mackie as
a “conservationist”, who implicitly encourages us to live with
the contradiction (cf. Olson 2014, chap. 9) or by reading him as
a “fictionalist”, who encourages us to continue to make moral
claims but only as a sort ofmake-believe. Neither reading is very
plausible (Section 1).
In my view, a much more credible interpretation has recently
been put forward. In particular Victor Moberger has offered an
interpretation of Mackie as encouraging us to engage in what I
shall here refer to as “conceptual pruning” (Moberger 2017). This
is a form of conceptual reform, but not the standard form asso-
ciated with so-called “reforming definitions” (cf. Brandt 1979;
Köhler and Ridge 2013). Rather than offering entirely new def-
initions for moral terms and recommending them, Moberger
readsMackie as holding that ourmoral terms already have senses
which are entirely error-free. To this extent, Mackie is somewhat
surprisingly, not an error theorist—at least not in the standard
contemporary sense of “error theory”. The problem with our
common-sense moral practice, on this reading, is simply that
we do not typically use those terms in their error-free sense. In-
stead, our default is to use moral language in a problematically
objective sense. If we simply prune away the error-ridden uses of
moral language, then we can get on with moralizing by using
moral terms in their error-free, subjective senses. As it happens,
the error-free meanings of moral terms are such that they are
best understood not only as adverting to subjective values, but
in terms of what nowadays is called a “hybrid theory” (cf. Ridge
2014, chap. 3; Fletcher and Ridge 2014). A hybrid theory in the
relevant sense is one on which the relevant judgments are partly
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constituted by non-cognitive attitudes (other hybrid views build
the non-cognitive attitude only into the implicatures of speech-
act, but these views are less similar to Mackie’s).
Although this reading is very promising, Moberger’s case for
it is, in my view, incomplete in two important respects. First,
the positive case for this “conceptual pruning” interpretation
can be substantially amplified by connecting that reading to
Mackie’s more extensive semantic treatment of evaluative and
deontic terms (“good”, “reason”, “ought”, etc.) as systemati-
cally context-sensitive, as well as by noting the textual evidence
in sources beyondEthics: Inventing Right andWrong andMackie’s
own characterization of the works which heavily influenced his
metaethical views. Here the influence of Hume on Mackie’s
thinking cannot be underestimated.
Second, Moberger’s reading raises a pressing question: If the
only moral truth worth taking seriously is a purely subjective or
culturally relative one, then what sorts of reasons do we have for
“reinventing” morality? The proposed reinvention is meant to
be one undertaken for good reasons—that would be rational, as
Mackie sometimes puts it. Are the reasons to embrace Mackie’s
proposed reform moral, prudential, both or some other kind al-
together? Finally, in what sense, if any, are the reasons we have
for reforming morality “normative” for Mackie? This last ques-
tionmight seem anachronistic, given that the turn frommorality
to the more broadly “normative” came into full swing well af-
ter Mackie’s death. However, Mackie still would have wanted
some way of distinguishing the reasons we have for re-inventing
morality one way rather than another as being less arbitrary
than reasons fixed by some arbitrary principle or convention—
“good”, the reasons given by some “holy text”, the wishes of
some tyrant or the reasons laid down by a thieves’ code. The
suggestion is that it would be most charitable if the kinds of
reasons we attribute to him are normative in some recognizable
sense; this appeal to the principle of charity does not presuppose
that Mackie himself traded in the language of normativity.
Fortunately, both these lacunae in Moberger’s argument for
the “conceptual pruning” interpretation can be filled, and in this
essay I do just that. Here is the plan. First, I briefly explain why
rival interpretations (conservationism and fictionalism) are im-
plausible (Section 1). I then lay out Moberger’s interpretation
and his arguments for it (Section 2). I then bolster those argu-
ments with additional positive arguments and textual evidence,
showing that the conceptual pruning interpretation can be jus-
tified much more directly via Mackie’s broader semantic theory
(Section 3). Finally, I turn to the challenge of explaining what
sorts of reasons we have for re-inventing morality on this inter-
pretation, and the sense in which those reasons are normative;
this leads to a discussion of Mackie’s implicit view of practical
rationality (Section 4). Here again, Hume’s influence on Mackie
is evident.
1. Rival Interpretations
In this section, I considerfictionalist and conservationist readings
of Mackie in turn. Because the debate over these interpretations
is well-worn, I will be brief.
Fictionalism is a revisionary doctrine—a doctrine about how
we ought to use moral discourse once we have been convinced
that our existing discourse is thoroughly error-ridden. Revision-
ary fictionalism itself comes in at least two varieties: content-
fictionalism and attitude/force fictionalism. According to con-
tent fictionalism, moral judgments should be ordinary beliefs
with contents aboutwhat is true in a given fiction—“themorality
fiction”, or some such. According to attitude/force fictionalism,
moral judgments are not ordinary beliefs, but are some other
propositional attitude, perhaps of the sort we characteristically
take when engaging with proper fiction (novels, films, etc.) in
various ways—something akin to pretence or make-believe. My
critique of fictionalist readings of Mackie will not depend much
on which of these two versions is attributed to Mackie.
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What is the textual evidence in favour of a fictionalist reading?
Richard Joyce offers the following evidence:
On the very last page of his book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong,
John Mackie (1977) suggests that moral discourse—which he has
argued is deeply error-laden—can continue with the status of a
“useful fiction”. (Joyce 2005, xx)
This is not convincing. First, Mackie’s remark is presented in
a somewhat offhand way, at the very end of the book, with no
elucidation. Second, and much more importantly, what Mackie
actually says in this passage is not that we “can continue” with
morality as a useful fiction, as Joyce glosses the passage, but
rather that “the objectification of moral values and obligations
is not only a natural but also a useful fiction” (Mackie 1977,
239). Mackie here says nothing about continuing with the rel-
evant fiction, but instead uses the present tense, and is pretty
clearly describing our current practice, which he clearly took not
to be one which embodies fictionalism—if it did, then ordinary
practice would be guilty of no error! When Mackie attributes a
“useful fiction” to ordinary practice here, he is not attributing
any of the fancy machinery of fictionalism, but is instead using
the phrase in one of its vernacular senses, as when one attributes
a false belief to someone but allows that the belief, while false,
is useful. That Mackie here is discussing our existing practice,
rather than any intended reforming fictionalism, is even more
clear in that he immediately considers the worry that it might be
dangerous “to expose it as a fiction”.
It may seem churlish to focus on this single piece of textual
evidence at length. I have done so in part because it is one of
the few pieces of text used to warrant this reading of Mackie,
and this is not surprising. There are very few other passages
that could be used to support such a reading. In fact, the word
‘fiction’ does not appear anywhere else in Ethics: Inventing Right
andWrong. Moreover, whenMackie in anotherwork (TheMiracle
of Theism) characterizes religion as a fiction, he clearly means
that it is a systematically false system of beliefs (Mackie 1982,
224), suggesting that he tends to use this idiom as colourful way
of expressing an error theory rather than some fancy form of
fictionalism. Indeed, in thatworkMackiemakes fairlydismissive
comments about a form of fictionalism in the religious realm,
expressing the worry that would plausibly carry over to the
moral case, suggesting that “one could not consistently make
a big thing of praising and glorifying a god that one at the same
time recognized to exist only in one’s own mind, or even jointly
in the minds of many believers like a figure in a widely current
myth or legend” (Mackie 1982, 277). One suspects that Mackie
would also think it hard to “make a big thing” of moral values
one at the same time knows are merely part of a shared myth.
Moreover, there are strong reasons to reject a fictionalist read-
ing. First, it is anachronistic; fictionalist treatments of various
forms of discourse was not really “in vogue” when Mackie was
writing. There is a risk of reading currently fashionable doctrines
back into Mackie’s 1970s context.
Second, Mackie never explicitly says that he favours a fic-
tionalist approach, nor does he argue for one. Given that the
fictionalist proposal is a bold and ambitious one, effectively call-
ing for widespread sociocultural engineering, one would have
expected Mackie to have been explicit about this and argued for
it more explicitly and carefully. It is not as if moral fictionalism is
not open to prima facie powerful objections, objections Mackie
was surely sharp enough to anticipate, yet he does not even
canvass those objections much less try to refute them. To that
extent, the fictionalist interpretation is uncharitable, attributing
a clearly inadequately defended view toMackie. The fact that he
only mentions a “useful fiction” in an offhand way on the very
last page of the book, and nowhere else, corroborates just how
uncharitable this reading is (cf. Kalf 2019).
Third, the fictionalist interpretation does not fit well with the
way in which Mackie characterizes the project of (re-)inventing
morality. In particular, Mackie repeatedly suggests that we can
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better refashion our moral practices if we do so without any
recourse to the idea of objective values, e.g.: “My hope is that
concrete moral issues can be argued out without appeal to any
mythical objective values or requirements or obligations or tran-
scendental necessities” (Mackie 1977, 199). Mackie makes simi-
lar remarks in Hume’s Moral Theory:
What, as Hume saw, holds for the duty of allegiance holds also for
morality as a whole. We are more likely to get its benefits without
its disadvantages if we see through its claim to absolute or objective
authority. (Mackie 1980, 156)
If Mackie were a fictionalist, then he would instead explain how
we can refashion our moral practices around a self-consciously
fictional conception of objective values—in effect, making up
new “stories” about these mythical objective values. Whereas
what Mackie actually suggests, repeatedly, is that we can better
reinvent our moral practices by doing without any appeal to
objective values, which presumably includes any in a fictional
mode.
What, then, about a conservationist reading of Mackie? What
evidence is there that Mackie intended for us to continue using
a mode of thought and discourse riddled with error? One argu-
ment for this reading, offered by CarolineWest, is that conserva-
tionism is the best explanation of Mackie’s thesis that first-order
and second-order questions are completely independent:
Mackie himself seemed to take this “business as usual” view . . .
First-order and second-order moral questions, he says, “are not
merely distinct, but completely independent”. (West 2010, 184–85)
The idea seems to be that Mackie’s second-order error theory
does not entail that we ought, all things considered, quit making
moral judgments. Since he does, himself, happily go on to ad-
vance numerousmoral judgments in the second half of the book,
the simplest explanation of this presumably is that he thinks we
have good reasons to go onmakingmoral judgments even while
knowing at some level they are all untrue.
Of course, to do thiswhile accepting the error theorywewould
have to learn to livewith a contradiction. Perhaps this is possible,
though. JonasOlson,who alsodefends a conservationist reading
of Mackie, argues that we can manage to do this through a kind
of compartmentalization, effectively believing the error theory
“in the seminar room” but making positive moral judgments
in other settings (Olson 2014, 190–96). Moreover, whether this
sort of compartmentalization is in fact possible, Mackie seems
himself, in the discussion of religious belief, to allow that it is (cf.
Mackie 1982, 220–21).2
Even if it is psychologically possible (on Mackie’s view) to
believe flagrantly contradictory things in this way, it must be
admitted that it is epistemologically unhealthy and weird. This
alone should create at least a presumptive case against this read-
ing. More to the point, conservationism fits very poorly with
Mackie’s characterizing the project of Ethics: Inventing Right and
Wrong being, in part, one of “conceptual reform”. Mackie first
made this observation in his earlier book, Problems From Locke,
suggesting that we need conceptual reform both in the case of
personal identity (his topic there) and ethics:
A fairly plausible suggestion is that we should adopt the revised
Lockean account, openly admitting that it is not a correct analysis
of our present concept, but proposing it as a conceptual reform and
as a factual analysis, an account of all that is true and relevant in
this area. [Footnote 27:] A similar conceptual reform, rather than
mere analysis of our present concepts is, I believe, needed in ethics.
I hope to discuss this topic in another book. (Mackie 1976, 196)
It is pretty clear that this other book was to be Ethics: Inventing
Right andWrong. Moreover,Mackie’smain aim in the secondhalf
of Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong was to (re)-invent morality
2Apoint I owe to an anonymous referee footnoted byVictorMoberger in his
discussion (see Moberger 2017, 5 n 12). Mackie’s view here is quite different
from the one defended by Bart Streumer, also an error theorist; see Streumer
(2017).
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(cf. Moberger 2017, 4–5). For Mackie, it is important that we
“remake” morality:
[M]orality is not to be discovered but to be made; we cannot brush
this aside by adding ‘but it has been made already, long ago’. It
may well need to be in part remade. (Mackie 1977, 123)
Remaking morality does not sound much like “business as
usual”. The conservationist might reply that Mackie’s aim is
to remake morality in terms of its first-order content, and do-
ing that is compatible with “business as usual” in the sense of
continuing to use moral language in a way that encodes a false
presupposition of objective values. Indeed, in the sentences just
following the quotation above,Mackie argues thatwhile theduty
of fidelity is worth preserving, the virtue of patriotismmay have
“outlived its usefulness”.
Amuchmoreplausible interpretation is thatMackie is inviting
us to reject the error-ridden moral concepts which presuppose
objective values and to deploy some other moral concepts. It is
with those error-free concepts that we should reinvent morality,
developing new first-order moral views which are informed by
our rejection of objective value. Just what these error-free moral
concepts are, though, is a verygoodquestion, a question towhich
I turn in the next section.
2. Conceptual Pruning and Hybrid Theory:
Moberger’s Reading
Given that Mackie is in the business of conceptual reform, what
sort of reform does he advocate? On some ways of understand-
ing concepts, they are abstract entities, not capable of change, so
talk of conceptual reform is perhaps best not taken literally. It is
therefore often associated instead with changing the meanings
of terms, so that they come to express new concepts. The most
common approach to conceptual reform (or “conceptual engi-
neering”, as it is sometimes called) takes the form of offering a
“reforming definition”.3 Here one takes some vexed philosoph-
ical term, like “free will”, and argues that the ordinary concept
it expresses is defective in some way. One then offers a new “re-
forming” definition for the corresponding term, arguing that the
new definition allows the discourse to do the job it was in some
sense “meant to do” but without the problems associated with
its original meaning. A standard worry about such approaches
is that they simply change the subject.
Interestingly, this is not the only project worthy of the name
“conceptual reform”. Another approachmight instead be called
“conceptual pruning”. Here one takes some vexed ordinary lan-
guage term, and argues that for at least a wide (perhaps the
predominant) range of meanings, the term is defective in some
way. One then argues that the term is, however, ambiguous
in some way, and that in some of its ordinary senses, it is not
defective. One then argues that we should “prune away” the
defective uses, and shift over to using the termmore consistently
in its error-free way. One advantage of this approach is that the
worry that one has simply “changed the subject” does not arise;
no new definitions are being proposed “from the armchair”.
It might be useful to consider a more down to earth exam-
ple. Consider the term “luck”. It is sometimes used to refer to
a purported “projectable” property, such that some people are
lucky and if they are lucky then they not only have a track record
of doing better than average or than you would expect given
their abilities, you can also base predictions about their likeli-
hood to do well, win bets, etc., in the future on their luckiness.
On this view, luckiness is a robust property whose instantiation
increases the odds of success for the lucky person. In this sense
of “luck” we should be error theorists about luck. In another,
not completely unrelated, sense of “luck”, though, someone is
lucky with respect to some domain if and only if they did better
3Cf. Cappelen (2018), Scharp (2013). The phrase “conceptual engineering”
stems from Blackburn (1999).
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than one should have rationally predicted ex ante, taking into
account their abilities, etc. In this sense, someone who gets dealt
great hands in poker over and over is lucky even if that in no
way grounds any predictions aboutwhat cards theywill be dealt
in the future. Here we should prune away the error-ridden (first)
sense of “lucky” but retain the second, naturalistically acceptable
sense of the word.4
Although he does not use the label “conceptual pruning”,
this is basically the interpretation of Mackie offered by Victor
Moberger in a recent paper (Moberger 2017). In this section, I
summarize themain lines of his interpretationandhis arguments
for it.
Moberger argues that Mackie is a “semantic pluralist” about
moral discourse. On his reading, Mackie holds that there are
“two different strands of moral discourse”, about which two
different stories should be told. The first strand presupposes ob-
jective values and is therefore error-ridden. This is, for Mackie,
by far the most pervasive form of moral discourse. The sec-
ond strand, though, does not presuppose objective values and is
error-free. On this interpretation, it is misleading to call Mackie
an error theorist in the modern idiom, since that is usually de-
fined in unqualified, universal terms—as holding that all sub-
stantive [putting to one side tautologies] moral claims are un-
true. On Moberger’s reading, Mackie is an error theorist only
in a slightly weaker sense; he holds that most forms of ordinary
moral discourse are error-ridden. Moberger usefully compares
Mackie’s views to the kind of pluralism defended by Gill (2009),
according to which ordinary moral discourse is not as semanti-
cally uniform as much metaethical theorizing seems to suppose.
How does Moberger argue for this somewhat surprising in-
terpretation? He begins with some textual evidence, pointing
out that Mackie very consistently qualifies his claims about or-
dinary moral discourse by saying only, e.g., that “many” or “
4Thanks to Guy Fletcher for suggesting this nice example.
in the main” or that “ordinarily” moral judgments presuppose
objectivity, citing these passages [emphasis added]:
[It] can plausibly bemaintained at least thatmanymoral judgments
contain a categorically imperative element . . . (Mackie 1977, 29)
[M]ost people in making moral judgments implicitly claim, among
other things, to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive.
(Mackie 1977, 35)
[In] everyday moral judgments . . . the claim for moral authority is
ordinarily there . . . (Mackie 1977, 41–42)
[E]thical uses [of “good”] are particularly likely to [involve] the
concept of objective moral value. (Mackie 1977, 59)
[T]he main ethical use [of “good”] does refer to supposed intrinsic
requirements. (Mackie 1977, 63)
The belief in objective moral requirements [is] implicit in much
ordinary moral thinking . . . (Mackie 1980, 141–42)
AsMoberger points out, it would be very odd forMackie so con-
sistently to qualify his attribution of error to folkmoral discourse
if he did not think that at least some of our moral judgments do
not presuppose objective value.
A second piece of evidence Moberger offers for Mackie’s se-
mantic pluralism is the way in which he formulates his ontologi-
cal claim. Mackie never says there are nomoral values, only that
the there are no objective values (and so ipso facto no objective
moral values). Moreover, he sometimes formulates his positive
view as “moral subjectivism”, and entitles the first chapter of his
book “The Subjectivity of Values”, strongly suggesting that he
thinks there are subjective moral values.
A third reason Moberger offers for reading Mackie as a se-
mantic pluralist is that it allows us to read his conceptual reform
programme in the second half of the book as a form of what
I am calling “conceptual pruning”. Given that at least some of
our actual moral discourse is amenable to a subjectivist reading,
we can in principle just abandon the objectivist strands of moral
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 8 no. 4 [6]
discourse and switch over to more consistently speaking in a
subjectivist idiom. This is an advantage of reading Mackie as a
semantic pluralist insofar as it can explain why the second half
of Mackie’s book does not contradict the first half better than
rival interpretations.
Fourthly, Moberger argues that reading Mackie as a seman-
tic pluralist helps vindicate his otherwise confusing claims in
chapter one about how second-order and first-order claims are
entirely independent of one another. On the standard reading of
Mackie as an error-theorist, this is an odd claim, since it seems
like his second-order view logically contradicts our first-order
moral claims, since it asserts that they are all untrue. Whereas
on Moberger’s reading, independence makes sense; so long as
we stick to purely subjective construals of our first-order claims,
Mackie’s error theory is logically compatiblewithwhatever first-
order view one likes.
Actually, this line of argument is complicated by a remark
Mackie makes in a paper only published posthumously, in a
volume edited by Joan and Penelope Mackie. In “Bootstraps
Enterprises”, he clarifies his claims about neutrality as follows:
Canwhat I say here be reconciledwithwhat I say inmy book (p. 16)
about the complete independence of first and second order views?
Yes, because the first-order views referred to there were construed
more widely than the views internal to a bootstraps enterprise . . .
The first order moral views with which any second order view is
compatible are identified simply as approval of and support for
certain things and condemnation of others. (Mackie 1985b, 147)
Taken at face value, this passage suggests that Mackie had in
mind an expressivist reading of moral discourse when allow-
ing for the compatibility of his second-order view with any
first-order view one likes. It is only on an expressivist view
that moral views are literally identical with one’s attitudes of
approval/support/condemnation, as Mackie suggests here. By
contrast, on the hybrid subjectivist view Mackie also thinks ap-
plies to ordinary language moral judgments are only partly con-
stituted by such attitudes. They are also partly constituted by
representational beliefs about the requirements of contextually
specified moral institutions.
I do not think this spoils the overarching case for Moberger’s
reading. At most, it shows that he cannot appeal to Mackie’s
remarks about neutrality as evidence for his reading. But there
is ample evidence independently of that. My own view is that
the evidence for the subjectivist reading is on the whole much
stronger than the slender evidence for an expressivist read-
ing supplied by this one sentence in a reply to Dworkin that
Mackie didn’t himself properly polish/work up for publication
andwhich thereforemaynot represent his consideredview. Fur-
ther, Mackie’s remark here is also compatible with my reading
andMoberger’s, in thatMackiemight have allowed that ’morally
good’ (etc.) admits of both a subjectivist and an expressivist read-
ing in ordinary language already, albeit these uses are very rare
compared to the error-infected ones. He could then be read
as pruning away the error-theoretic ones but keeping both of
these. In fact, this could help with the puzzle about “norma-
tivity” I discuss in Section 4 below. However, I am not sure
whether to attribute this expressivist view to Mackie to help re-
solve that problem given how limited the evidence is for that
reading. Readers who are more tempted by that reading will
find it even easier to resolve the problem discussed in Section 4.
Given that, on the whole, there seems to be a reasonable case
for reading Mackie as a semantic pluralist and a conceptual
pruner, an obvious question is what sense should be attached
to our moral claims in their subjectivist idiom? On Moberger’s
reading,Mackie takes subjectivemoral judgments to be about the
requirements (etc.) of some contextually specified moral institu-
tion, where typically the relevant institution is one the speaker
occupies. Institutions are, for Mackie, social practices in which
participants conform to certain patterns of behaviour and deploy
socially enforced sanctions on those who deviate. Mackie offers
many examples of non-moral institutions, such as chess, and ar-
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gues that morality is an institution which functions to help us
counteract our limited sympathy (Mackie 1977, 108).
Mackie distinguishes between speaking about an institution
“from the outside”, in the idiom of a sociologist commenting
on its requirements, on the one hand, and speaking “within the
institution”, on the other. When we speak within a given in-
stitution in Mackie’s sense, our claims are not purely descrip-
tive (as in the external mode), but instead are infused with
evaluative/prescriptive force. Mackie illustrates this distinction
by arguing that Searle’s famous attempt to derive an “ought”
from an “is” fails because Searle conflates these two modes of
thought/discourse with respect to the institution of promising
(Mackie 1977, 66–72).
Moberger reads Mackie as taking what in modern terminol-
ogy would be a “hybrid” theory of moral claims madewithin the
institution. Hybrid theories of moral discourse, in the relevant
sense, hold that the relevant moral judgments are constituted
not merely by representational beliefs (here, about one’s moral
institution, say) but also by associated non-cognitive attitudes—
attitudes of endorsement of the behaviour required by the in-
stitution, in favour of sanctioning those who deviate from those
norms, etc. Moberger offers considerable and in my view con-
vincing textual evidence for this reading. Mackie was in this
sense “ahead of his time”, since hybrid theories were not much
discussed when he was writing, but have become something of
a cottage industry more recently.5
Finally, Moberger notes a further subtlety. Mackie does not
think ordinary discourse sharply distinguishes the subjective
and the objective elements. Rather, he takes typical moral claims
to be composites of the subjective (and hybrid theoretical) and
the objective. Typicalmoral claims aremade fromwithin amoral
institution, both describe and endorse that institution’s demands
5For some discussion of the variety of modern hybrid theories, see Fletcher
and Ridge (2014). See also Ridge (2014, chap. 3).
and claim (or perhaps presuppose) that those demands also have
objective validity. Having distinguished adverting to objective
requirements and speaking within a moral institution, Mackie
adds that these elements “do not normally occur in isolation,
and views which single out any one of them as the meaning of
moral terms are implausible” (Mackie 1977, 72).
So far, so good. Moberger’s interpretation is a huge step for-
ward, and sheds great light on what is going on in the transi-
tion from chapter 1 of Mackie’s book to the second half of the
book. However, there is more work to be done. First, although
Moberger makes a strong case for his reading, the positive case
can be made much stronger and more direct, as I explain in the
following section. Second, the conceptual pruner/hybrid theory
reading of Mackie leads naturally into the question of what sorts
of reasonsMackie is offering for refashioningmorality in oneway
rather than another. I turn to these remaining tasks in the next
two sections.
3. Strengthening the Positive Case: Mackie’s
Contextualist Semantics
Moberger’s case for reading Mackie as a semantic pluralist rests
primarily on (1) the ways in which Mackie consistently quali-
fies his attribution of error to ordinary moral thought/discourse
and his formulation of the main ontological claim and (2) the
explanatory power such a reading provides when it comes to
understanding Mackie’s broader project. These arguments are
well-taken, but they are also somewhat indirect. As it happens,
a much more direct and stronger case can be made for reading
Mackie as a semantic pluralist if we also attend to his positive
semantic views about evaluative anddeontic languagemore gen-
erally. Moreover, attending to these aspects of Mackie’s view re-
veal that it is a slight oversimplification to speak of “two strands”
of moral judgment.
Mackie spends two chapters (chaps. 2 and 3) laying out a se-
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mantics for “good”, “ought”, and “reason”. In all three cases,
the meaning of the term should be understood in terms of some
contextually specified requirement(s). To say something is good
is to say it is “such as to satisfy requirements (etc.) of the kind
in question” (Mackie 1977, 55–56). To say one ought or must do
something is (roughly; I gloss over Mackie’s distinction between
“ought” and “must”) to say that there is some contextually spec-
ified requirement that one do it. To say there is a reason to do
something is (roughly) to say that doing it would tend to lead
to the satisfaction of some contextually specified requirement.
Requirements can be provided by desires or interests, but also
by institutions (Mackie 1977, 80–82). Mackie thinks that inmoral
contexts speakers typically have in mind the elusive idea of re-
quirements that are “just there”, or “part of the fabric of the
universe”, but our interest is in uses that avoid those errors.
Mackie’s semantics predicts that claims about what is good,
what one ought to do, and what there is reason to do are relative
to contextually specified requirements, and these requirements
can be provided by institutions. Mackie also very clearly thinks
of morality as a kind of institution (Mackie 1977, 72). These
commitments together entail that a speaker can felicitously use
moral language to make claims about what a contextually speci-
fied moral institution requires. Indeed, this is no surprise, since
we already saw that Mackie thinks most ordinary moral claims
do advert to such institutions. However, he also thinksmost ordi-
nary claims introduce a presupposition that those requirements
also track what is objectively good.
Even if most uses of moral language carry this presupposition
of objective value, the semantic theory predicts that it should
be at least possible for a speaker to use, e.g., “morally ought” to
advert to the requirements of a moral institution without intro-
ducing any presupposition of objective value. Mackie is quite
explicit that nothing compels us to add a presupposition of ob-
jective validity to our claims about institutional requirements,
presumably including moral institutions (indeed, Mackie in the
following passage is discussing our reasons to alleviate the suf-
fering of others, and so has moral reasons in view):
[C]ertainly nothing compels us to reinterpret the requirements of
an institution, however well established, however thoroughly en-
shrined in our ordinaryways of thinking and speaking, as objective,
intrinsic, requirements of the nature of things.
(Mackie 1977, 79–80)
That this possibility is already present, if merely latent, in our
discourse, would already be enough for the “conceptual prun-
ing” approach to work, since Mackie could be urging us to drop
the problematic uses of moral language and start using moral
language in ways already available to us, without any need for
a “reforming definition”. So, semantic pluralism can be argued
for much more directly than the more indirect argument found
in Moberger.
Note, moreover, that the kind of systematic context-sensitivity
for moral terms found in Mackie’s theory is not well understood
in terms of there being simply “two strands” of moral discourse,
one objective and one subjective, as Moberger suggests. At least,
this oversimplifies dramatically. Claims about what is morally
good, e.g., can be relative to the moral institutions of one’s so-
ciety, some other society, a merely possible society, one’s own
personal standards, the institutions implicit in some sacred text,
and so on. Any of these moral claims can, in turn, be combined
with a presupposition that the relevant institutions track objec-
tive value or not. We can in principle make claims about what
requirements there are “in the fabric of the universe”, bringing
in objective value without any reference to institutions. Finally,
Mackie also draws a distinction Mackie between morality in the
broad sense, which is a fully general theory of conduct, and
morality in the narrow sense, which functions more specifically
to help us overcome our limited sympathies.
Of course, the conceptual pruning interpretation would be
bolstered if it could be shown that Mackie thought the possibil-
ity of purely subjective uses of moral language were not merely
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latent in the semantics for moral vocabulary, but that we actu-
ally already use moral discourse in this way sometimes. Here
the textual evidence mobilized by Moberger is very much to
the point. The fact that Mackie so consistently hedges his for-
mulation of the error theory with locutions like “many moral
judgments”, what is “ordinarily” claimed, what “most people”
mean to claim, and so on, strongly suggests that Mackie thinks
that people do sometimes usemoral language in a purely subjec-
tive way. Indeed, Mackie seems to explicitly endorse this in his
discussion of “justice”, which he says in one sense requires only
fidelity to the relevant standards, and no queer value entities:
[T]here is an objective distinctionwhich applies inmany suchfields,
and yet would itself be regarded as a peculiarly moral one: the
distinction between justice and injustice. In one important sense of
the word, it is a paradigm case of an injustice if a court declares
someone to be guilty of an offence of which it knows him to be
innocent. More generally, a finding is unjust if it is at variance
with what the relevant law and the facts together require . . . justice
or injustice of decisions relative to standards can be a thoroughly
objective matter. (Mackie 1977, 26; emphasis added)
When Mackie says this is an objective matter, he does not mean
it involves objective value. Rather, he means that the justice or
injustice of a decision can be derived in an objectively valid way
from the relevant descriptive facts. Here Mackie clearly counte-
nances error-free uses of “justice”.
In fact, there is evenmore textual evidence thanMoberger pro-
vides for his proposed reading, some of it arising in the chapters
in which Mackie offers his broader semantic theory. For exam-
ple, in his discussion of the semantics of “good”, Mackie allows
that we sometimes use “good” to engage in what he calls “ego-
centric commendation”, where this “should, perhaps, be called
not purely descriptive, since an essential element in it is the
speaker’s implicit endorsing of the requirements . . . which the
thing commended is being said to be such as to satisfy. But it
is partly descriptive, in that it claims both that the thing has
the intrinsic characteristics, whatever they are, and (hence) that
it bears this relation to those requirements” (Mackie 1977, 61).
The most straightforward reading of this is that “good” is some-
times used to make descriptive claims about what satisfies cer-
tain requirements and at the same time express approval of those
requirements and commending the object of evaluation.
We are also told inHume’sMoral Theory that a “mixed account”
could provide a more plausible conceptual reform than either
pure descriptivism or pure expressivism (Mackie 1980, 71), and
Mackie in that passage footnotes his own Ethics: Inventing Right
and Wrong, suggesting this is his own view. Further, Mackie
elsewhere endorses such a hybrid view of legal terms and talk
of responsibility:
[L]egal terms and terms like ‘responsibility’ contain a prescriptive
element, which must be distinguished from their descriptive ele-
ment, and also if we say that in certain circumstances it is correct for
a judge to give such-and-such a decision, we are ourselves making
or quoting a further, higher-level, prescription: we are prescribing
when the judge is to prescribe. (Mackie 1955, 35)
Even more clearly, Mackie explicitly endorses a hybrid theory of
aesthetic value judgments, and in the same breath indicates that
this approach has been “worked out” in the case of ethics:
Perhaps the pure subjectivist theory, and the pure objectivist one,
have both gone wrong in the same way. Each of them has as-
sumed that an aesthetic judgment is made in one move. But again,
we can usefully borrow an account of value judgments which has
been worked out and discussed particularly with regards to ethics,
the core of which is that a value judgment involves at least two
moves . . . in making an evaluative judgment we are at once saying
or hinting that the object judged has certain natural characteristics,
and commending it, or perhaps condemning it, on that account. . .
(Mackie 1969, 64)
In addition to all of this direct textual evidence from other
sources, the proposed reading of Mackie fits well with the fig-
uresMackie saysmost profoundly influenced his views in ethics:
From the modern period, Stevenson, Ayer, and Westermarck,
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andmore historically the “Britishmoralists”, but most especially
David Hume, whose moral philosophy Mackie wrote an entire
book about (Mackie 1977, 241). Stevenson can plausibly be read
as a kind of hybrid theorist, holding that moral claims state that
the speaker approves of something and then includes a “do so
as well!” element, which expresses the speaker’s approval (cf.
Stevenson 1944). Ayer famously emphasizes the use of moral
language to express as well as report one’s attitudes.
Furthermore, there aremanyother passages inwhichMackie’s
claims about our moral concepts being infected with error are
hedged to include only “typical” or “most” uses. For example,
in addition to the passages mentioned by Moberger, we find the
remark that “typicalmoral statements do not seem to mean what
any dispositionally descriptive account . . . says that they mean”
(Mackie 1980, 69), where this is because they typically involve
a presupposition of objective value. Again, we are told that the
error theory goes against assumptions “built into some of the
ways in which language is used” (Mackie 1977, 35). Mackie also
contrasts European ethical concepts with the “ethical concepts
of Plato and Aristotle” (Mackie 1977, 45), further corroborating
his commitment to semantic pluralism.
One piece of text which might seem to count against
Moberger’s reading isMackie’s seemingly unqualified claim that
in moral contexts “good” “is used as if it were the name of a
supposed non-natural quality” (Mackie 1977, 32). Even here,
though, Mackie qualifies this claim, actually saying only that it
“would not be so far wrong” to say that “good” has this meaning
in moral contexts. The inclusion of this caveat makes this pas-
sage compatible with Moberger’s reading, since the claim could
be partly wrong because some moral contexts are not such that
“good” is used in this objective sense. Similarly, the suggestion
that objectivism “has a basis . . . in the meanings of moral terms”
(Mackie 1977, 31) is compatible with some strands of moral dis-
course not involving this commitment.6
6Another reading of this passage consistent with the spirit of Moberger’s
Oneworry about this reading ofMackie is how it squares with
his advocacy of “remaking” morality. One tempting reading of
Mackie’s talk of “remaking” morality is as calling for replacing
our existing moral concepts with new ones, where these new
oneshave adifferent content—acontent suitably informedbyour
rejection of objective value. Indeed, it seems clear that Mackie’s
remaking project essentially involves changing the content of
morality in a deliberate way, and it might seem obscure how the
content could change if we retain the same concepts. Moberger
himself has very little to say about how this remaking should go
on his account.
This objection can be found in Wouter Kalf’s critique of
Moberger. Kalf offers the following objection:
[Moberger’s] interpretation fails to mention that after latching on
to morality in the narrow sense, we should change the content of
reading would be that the commitment to objective value is built into the
meanings of moral terms in the form of a conventional implicature a la Grice.
Conventional implicatures are part of conventional meaning and cannot be
cancelled (unlike their conversational cousins), but they are also not part of
the literal content. On this reading, the conceptual pruning would simply
be to drop the conventional implicature but keep the strict, literal semantic
content. This would be like no longer using ‘but’, but only using ‘and’ as one’s
conjunctive connective, e.g., I prefer Moberger’s reading simply because the
conventional implicature readingwould predict that alluses ofmoral language
implicate objective value, whereas Mackie very carefully and repeatedly says
only that “typical”, “most”, etc. uses do. It is, though, worth noting that
if someone thought we should dismiss those passages for some reason and
put more weight on the one or two passages in which Mackie makes claims
about what is built into conventional meanings, then a reading very much like
Moberger’s, in spirit, would remain available in the form of a conventional
implicature approach. Generalized conversational implicature is yet another
view one could explore here, though that would predict that only contexts in
which the implicature of objective value is explicitly cancelled are exceptions
to Mackie’s generalization. I do not think there is adequate textual evidence
for that reading, but it is more promising than the conventional implicature
approach (cf. Fletcher and Ridge 2014). Both of these readings would have the
very surprising upshot that evenmoral claimswhich do encode an assumption
of objective value need not be untrue, since implicatures are distinct from
literal, truth-conditional content.
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morality in light of changes in the circumstances of justice, and that
we should change morality’s content by replacing our concept of
the good ‘with some other concept of the good’ (149). Moberger’s
interpretation is therefore . . . incomplete in this crucial respect be-
cause it fails to do justice toMackie’s remark that after the discovery
thatwe should be error theorists, we should also change the content
of our new schmoral discourse. (Kalf 2019, 179)
One strand of Kalf’s objection here is textual, citing Mackie’s ap-
parent reference to the need to replace our concept of good with
some other concept. However, Kalf takes this passage out of con-
text. In the quoted passage (on p. 149), Mackie is clearly talking
about the utilitarian’s concept of “the good” rather than our own
concept, and he is floating an option he clearly doesn’t endorse,
namely keeping the consequentialist conception of right action
but tweaking the associated value theory. This clearly provides
no support for reading Mackie as supporting a reforming defi-
nition for our own moral concepts.
Still, the core of Kalf’s worry might be independent of this
appeal to the text. Clearly, Mackie thinks we need to change the
foundational content of morality. It might seem obscure how he
could do that without providing us with new concepts. Same
concepts, same truth-conditions, one might worry. More for-
mally:
(1) Mackie’s proposal is that we change the truth-conditional
content of our most basic moral judgments.
(2) The only way to change the truth-conditional content of our
most basic moral judgments is by replacing our existing
moral concepts with new ones [same concepts, same basic
truth-conditions, since concepts fix truth-conditions].
(3) Therefore, Mackie’s proposal requires that we replace our
existing moral concepts with new ones.
The problem with this argument should be apparent once it is
stated, so long as we remember the content of the moral judg-
ments which survive Mackie’s “pruning”. Those moral judg-
ments will characteristically be about the moral institutions of
the speaker’s community. Institutions, though, are human in-
ventions in a broad sense—patterns of behaviour, sanctions. As
such, they can themselves be reinvented. We can thus change the
truth-conditional content of our most basic moral judgment by
changing the relevant institutions.
For example, Mackie thinks patriotism as a virtue may be past
its “sell by” date. Taking his advice, we can change ourmoral in-
stitutions so that they no longer encourage patriotism and make
“patriotism is a virtue” (which we may take as a basic moral
truth—one not derived from within our institutions from some
more basic norm) go from true to false. We can, in this way,
change the truth-conditional content of our most basic moral
judgments by changing our institutions and without replacing
our existing moral concepts with new ones. By way of analogy,
we can change the content of ‘legally permissible now in Scot-
land’ by changing the law, rather than by changing our concept
of the law. Premise (2) in the argument above is thus false.
Although Kalf’s objection can be dispatched easily enough,
it suggests another challenge for Moberger’s interpretation, and
this challenge is not so easily met. Moreover, by seeing how
to meet this challenge we can fill an important lacuna in the
proposed interpretation. I turn to this challenge and how to
meet it in the final section.
4. Why Remake Morality? (And in What Sense of
‘Morality’?)
Mackie’s proposal that we remake morality is not presented as
an arbitrary suggestion, something we can take or leave as we
like. Rather, he presents it as something we have strong reason to
do. But what sorts of reasons isMackie offering? Talk of reasons
is, for Mackie, always relative to contextually specified require-
ments. Requirements, in turn, can be derived from institutions,
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desires, the law, conventions and other sources. What, then, is
the source of the requirements which ground our reasons to
remake morality and why do they matter?
A plausible constraint on Mackie’s argument for remaking
morality is that the reasons he offers are ones which in some
sense are “normative”. Of course, ‘normative’ is a term of art,
open to multiple interpretations, and the turn from morality
to the normative in metaethics came decades after Mackie was
writing. There is, therefore, a risk of anachronism in formulat-
ing the challenge in this way. Indeed, T.M. Scanlon specifically
reference’s Ethics: Inventing Right andWrongwhen remarking on
the shift in metaethics as a field from focusing on morality in
particular to the normative:
Contemporary metaethics differs in two important ways from the
metaethics of the 1950s and 1960s and even the later 1970s, when
JohnMackie wrote Ethics: Inventing Right andWrong. In that earlier
period, discussion in metaethics focused almost entirely on moral-
ity . . . Today . . . a significant part of the debate concerns practical
reasoning and normativity more generally . . . (Scanlon 2014, 1)
However, this concern about anachronism notwithstanding, it
also seems clear thatMackie thought the reasons he offeredwere
not chosen at random. For example, supposeMackie had offered
reasons derived from the requirements of the “Vory v Zakone”,
or “thieves’ code”, loosely translated from theRussian—acodeof
conduct governing Russian organized crime. This would rightly
strike us as bizarre and philosophically uninteresting. Given
Mackie’s semantics for ‘reason’, though, there will trivially be
true claims about what reasons there are relative to the Vory v
Zakone. Clearly, Mackie thinks the reasons he offers us to re-
make morality have more of a “grip” on us in some intuitive
sense—that they matter—than the reasons grounded by the re-
quirements of the Vory v Zakone. A plausible constraint on
Mackie’s project, then, is to explain why the reasons he offers are
privileged in some way that, e.g., the reasons grounded by the
Vory v Zakone are not.
It is important to see that Mackie’s project taken on its own
terms requires some specification of the kinds of reasons on of-
fer here; this puts the worry about anachronism in the right
light. Crucially, on Mackie’s contextualist semantics, any use
of ’reason’, including his own use of ’reason’ when claiming we
have reason to reinvent morality, is indexed to some contextually
specified requirement or set of requirements. So we need some
account of which requirements we are meant to have in mind
when Mackie tells us we have good reason to remake moral-
ity. My suggestion is that whatever requirements we do read
Mackie as implicitly having in mind, it would be more plausible,
and hence more charitable if those requirements were plausibly
seen as normative. That interpretative argument crucially does
not require that Mackie himself was implicitly thinking in terms
of a normative/non-normative distinction. Rather, it requires
only that the interpreter be guided in their reading by the idea
that the requirement(s) Mackie did have in mind are ones we
would classify as normative, as that would track with their not
seeming, e.g., as arbitrary as the Vory v Zakone requirements.
Lest we read Mackie as having in mind some totally arbitrary
set of requirements when he tells us we have reason to reform
morality, which seems highly implausible, this constraint seems
like a good way to ensure that our interpretation is charitable.
Before trying to see what kind of reasons Mackie might be
offering for remakingmorality, we should be clear about in what
sense of “morality”, he thinks it needs to be remade. Recall that
Mackie distinguishes morality in the broad sense from morality
in the narrow sense. A morality in the broad sense “would be a
general, all-inclusive theory of conduct”, while morality in the
narrow sense “is a system...of constraints on conduct . . . whose
central task is to protect the interests of persons other than the
agent andwhich presents themselves to an agent as checks on his
natural inclinations” (Mackie 1977, 106). Interestingly, morality
in the broad sense tends to be person-relative, and the morality
to which a person subscribes in this sense “would be whatever
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body of principles he allowed ultimately to guide or determine
his choices of action” (Mackie 1977, 106). By contrast, moral-
ity in the narrow sense is an essentially social phenomenon—
morality in the narrow sense is clearly an institution, constituted
by human practices. This is because the whole point of morality
in the narrow sense is to help people coordinate with one an-
other peacefully; in this sense a purely private morality would
be “worthless”:
If a morality is to perform the sort of function described in Chapter
5, it must be adopted socially by a group of people in their dealings
withoneanother . . . Privately imagined rules orprinciples of action
are worthless . . . What counts is rules that are actually recognized
by the members of some social circle, large or small, and that thus
sets up expectations and claims. (Mackie 1977, 147–48)
The context makes it clear that the “sort of function” Mackie
invokes here is the one associated with morality in the narrow
sense, and that he therefore thinks morality in the narrow sense
must be a social reality.
When Mackie discusses the need to “remake” morality, it is
pretty clear that he primarily has in mind morality in the nar-
row sense. His arguments for remaking morality in one way
rather than another tend to appeal to considerations relating
the proposed reforms to the function of morality in the narrow
sense—helping us get along with one another. Furthermore, he
typically characterizes remaking morality as a shared project—
one we undertake together. This would not make much sense
if his aim were morality in the broad sense, which need not be
shared. Indeed, Mackie explicitly takes a sort of “to each his
own” approach to morality in the broad sense, allowing that
here there need not be agreement:
[I]t should be expected that different individuals and different
groups should have different ideals and values. Each person’s spe-
cial values will help to determine his morality in the broad sense;
his actions will be guided not simply by what he wants but also, to
some extent, by the endeavour to realize in some degree whatever
he sees as good. (Mackie 1977, 151).7
We should therefore read Mackie’s proposal to remake morality
as concerning morality in the narrow sense. This does not mean
his proposal is entirely independent of morality in the broad
sense. If most people’s morality in the broad sense prescribed
acting inways counter to the sort of morality in the narrow sense
Mackie proposes, then that proposal would be unrealistic and
unstable. Mackie therefore appeals to fairly widespread values
(e.g., avoiding pain, autonomy) that will inform just about ev-
eryone’s morality in the broad sense in arguing for his proposed
reform to morality in the narrow sense.8
What sorts of reasons, then, does Mackie offer for remaking
morality [in the narrow sense] in one way rather than another?
Typically, he offers prudential reasons. Here, for example, he
7It is striking how much this passage seems to anticipate Rawls’s views on
the extent of “reasonable pluralism” when it comes to what he calls “compre-
hensive views”, though these include more than morality in the broad sense
(e.g., theological and metaphysical views; cf. Rawls 1993, Lecture 4). The fact
that Mackie seems happy for us to continue making such judgments also un-
dermines Kalf’s reading, on which it is only morality in the broad sense which
is committed to objective values, and which we should jettison. Mackie actu-
ally thinks that both forms ofmoral thinking (broad and narrow) are amenable
to the presupposition of objective value, and that both have purely subjectivist
versions that are worth preserving; cf. Kalf (2019, §4).
8A further interesting question is what Mackie takes to fix the meaning
of moral claims in the broad sense. He seems most likely to have in mind
a subjectivist hybrid theory, where the content of those judgments is about
one’s own norms (or, perhaps, about the content of those norms) but where
making the judgment requires actually having the norms and attitudes in
question. That would fit well with Mackie’s characterization of a person’s
morality being fixed by the principles which guide his conduct and also with
his more general theory of the meanings of evaluative and prescriptive terms.
The other reading worth exploring would be an expressivist one, since it
is not obvious that Mackie’s objections to expressivism earlier in the book
would apply as forcefully to morality in the broad sense. On balance, though,
a subjectivist hybrid theory seems most likely what Mackie implicitly had
intended for discourse about morality in the broad sense.
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appeals to eachperson’s “own interest” to explainwhywe should
welcome the existence of morality in the narrow sense and to
explain why each of us should try to modify it to better “suit”
ourselves where it is not in our interest:
Everyone should, in his own interest, welcome the fact that there
is, and hope there will continue to be some system of morality, and
why, even if the existing system does not suit him, his aim should
be to modify it, at least locally, rather than to destroy it.
(Mackie 1977, 190)
Mackie allows that prudence and morality in the narrow sense
can in principle come apart, but is cautiously optimistic that it
will not do so too often, given that it will tend to be in our
interests to cultivate a conscience; those without one tend to be
shunned by others, and most amoralists are not good at hiding
their shamelessness. Having a conscience, in turn, itself partly
constitutes one’s well-being, for Mackie:
If someone . . . has at least fairly strong moral tendencies, the pru-
dential course, for him, will almost certainly coincide with what he
sees as the moral one, simply because he will have to live with his
conscience. (Mackie 1977, 191–92)
Mackie’s proposal for how we should remake morality also is
heavily informed by the need for realism—where realism here
means ensuring that morality dramatically depart from what
individual’s perceived self-interest (this is part of why he rejects
utilitarianism; see Mackie 1977, 132). Still, Mackie allows that
for some people, acting morally will sometimes and perhaps
often run counter to their interests. He simply suggests that this
will be sufficiently rare as to not undermine the tenability of his
proposed reforms.
Having some sense of the kinds of reasons Mackie offers for
remaking morality, we can now return to the “Vory v Zakone”
challenge. What is so special about prudence? Why is showing
that we have prudential reasons to remake morality as Mackie
recommends any more interesting that we have Vory v Zakone
reasons to remake it in a very different way? One option Mackie
explicitly rejects is the idea that prudence is a necessary require-
ment of rationality:
Even the rationality of prudence—in the sense of equal concern
for the interests and welfare at all future times of this same per-
son, oneself—is not quite as self-evident as is commonly supposed.
Personal identity is not absolute, as it is believed to be: as I argued
in Chapter 3, our concept of personal identity through time itself
functions as a sort of institution, aided by a contingent present
desire for our own future welfare. (Mackie 1977, 191)
Interestingly, Mackie here characterizes our concept of personal
identity as functioning “as a sort of institution” and refers the
reader back to Chapter 3. There he compares the concept of
personal identity to “an institution like promising” and suggests
that this concept introduces a “requirement for attention to the
future well-being of what will be the same human being as the
agent in question” (Mackie 1977, 78).
Mackie is here no doubt drawing on his broadly Lockean view
of personal identity, one developed in more detail elsewhere
(e.g., Mackie 1976, chap. 6). There he defends a “conceptual re-
form” of our ordinary concept of personal identity which he
argues is infected with error, having its identity over time ab-
solutely (“like a Lockean atom”; Mackie 1976, 194), rather than
relative to psychological or physical continuity of the subject.
On his proposed reforming definition, our concept of personal
identity should be understood as a natural kind term and given
an externalist semantics. The nominal essence of personal iden-
tity is, on this view, “whatever underlies and makes possible the
unity of consciousness”. The real essence underlying this is, for
Mackie, a species of bodily continuity, and he thinks this is at
least part of our ordinary concept, but that our ordinary concept
also includes dualist strands which he thinks we must jettison.
Interestingly, in this earlier work (Problems from Locke), Mackie
also suggested that prudence has no special claim to rationality:
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[T]hat there is no factual basis for the employment of our present
absolute concept . . . has an important bearing onmoral philosophy,
especially in bringing it about that there is no exclusive rationality
in having an equal concern for all of one’s future selves.
(Mackie 1976, 199)
One can also here as well see the profound influence Hume has
had on Mackie, since these passages also strongly echo Hume’s
infamous remark that “’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the
destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger”
(Hume 1739–40, 2.3.3.6). Reason for both Mackie and Hume is
always relative to one’s present desires.
Putting these pieces of the puzzle together, we can see that
Mackie takes the rationality of prudence to depend on the con-
tingent but systematic and widespread fact that each of us, at
each moment in time, tends to care deeply about the welfare of
future time-slices of the human being which constitutes oneself
at that moment in time. In taking part in the pseudo-institution
of personal identity, by deploying the concept of prudence, we
takeupan “internal” perspective on that pseudo-institution. Just
as someone who takes an “internal” perspective on the institu-
tion of promising thereby endorses the requirement to keep their
promises, and so tends to be appropriately motivated, someone
who takes an “internal” perspective on personal identity thereby
endorses the requirement to care equally about the welfare of fu-
ture time-slices of the humanbeingwhich underlies their current
unity of consciousness. In both cases, there is no categorical re-
quirement of rationality to care about either (promises or one’s
future welfare); the rational requirement follows only from an
agent’s contingent present desire.
This, in turn, gives us a clue as to how Mackie might answer
the “Vory v Zakone” challenge. Implicit in the passages inwhich
Mackie discusses the merely conditional rationality of prudence
is the view that at least a sufficient condition for an agent’s being
prima facie rationally required to do something is that doing
it would promote the satisfaction of one or more of the agent’s
present desires. Thatwould explainwhy the rationality of caring
about one’s future self depends on one’s contingently caring
about thewelfare of the humanbeingwhich currently constitutes
oneself. This hypothesis is corroborated by passages like the
following:
The rationality of morality (in the narrow sense) consists in the
fact . . . that men need moral rules and principles and dispositions
if they are to live together and flourish in communities . . . The
rationality of prudence consists in the fact that a man is more likely
to flourish if he has, at any one time, some concern for thewelfare of
later phases of this same human being . . . Both these contrast with
themore basic rationality of the hypothetical imperative, rationality
in the sense in which it is rational to do whatever will satisfy one’s
own present desires. (Mackie 1977, 228–29)
The rationality of doing “whatever will satisfy one’s present de-
sires” is taken to be “more basic” than the rationality of morality
and prudence. This passage, and connection with those quoted
above, strongly suggest the following understanding of how
Mackie could meet the “Vory v Zakone” challenge:
(1) Practical rationality is [at least inpart] amatter of doingwhat
will best promote the satisfaction of one’s present desires.
(2) Most people (for evolutionary reasons Mackie also can-
vasses), throughout most of their lives, care a great deal
about the well-being of their future selves (they take an “in-
ternal perspective” on the pseudo-institution of prudence).
(3) For most people, at most times, prudence is, therefore a
rational requirement.
(4) Therefore, establishing that the proposed reforms to moral-
ity in the narrow sense (one’s socially constructed moral
institutions) are such that they would be prudentially good
for most people is enough to establish a prima facie rational
requirement to support those reforms insofar as individuals
can effectively do so.
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(5) Rationality is normative; establishing that the proposed re-
forms are (generally) rationally required is enough to meet
the Vory v Zakone challenge.
The fifth stage of this response to the challenge is the only one I
have not yet discussed. Unfortunately, Mackie never much dis-
cusses practical rationality and “the normative”. It is, however,
commonplace for those working on the normative to character-
ize genuinely normative reasons as ones that an agent cannot
ignore, on pain of practical irrationality. Theorists often disagree
about which, if either, is more basic—normative reasons or ratio-
nality. The idea that the two are intimately linked in some way
is, though, widespread, and has been endorsed both by moral
realists, Kantian rationalists and expressivists.9 To that extent,
insofar asMackie can demonstrate that his proposed reforms are
rationally required, that is enough to show that they matter, in
some intuitive sense—that they are “normative”.
Moreover, even if this link to the normative can be reasonably
contested, rationality is plausibly an essential feature of human
nature. To that extent, showing how his proposed reforms are
rational is already enough to meet the Vory v Zakone challenge.
The Russian thieves’ code (and other such arbitrary conventions)
are no essential part of human nature in the way that rational-
ity plausibly is. To the extent that we take the study of human
nature to be part of philosophy’s core mission (as Mackie’s his-
torical influences, like David Hume, certainly did), it will be
philosophically interesting to show that the proposed reforms
are rational in a way that showing, e.g., that they would be sup-
ported by the norms of the Vory v Zakone would not.
Of course, the present aim theory of practical rationality, or
more modestly (perhaps all that Mackie needs) the thesis that
satisfying an agent’s present desire(s) is sufficient in itself to
ground a prima facie rational requirement, is itself highly con-
9See, e.g., Scanlon (2014), Korsgaard (1996), Smith (1994), and Ridge (2014).
For further useful discussion, see Dreier (2015).
troversial. But it is also a view with some attractions and inter-
esting philosophical justifications.10 Mymain aim here, though,
is not to defend Mackie’s overall view, but to offer an interpre-
tation that adequately balances charity and fidelity to the text.
The present aim conception of rationality has enough plausibil-
ity that attributing that view to Mackie does not seem terribly
uncharitable. It also has considerable textual support.
Moreover, this is a broadly Humean conception of practical
rationality. Hume thought reasonwas a real faculty of the mind,
but a fairly anaemic one which simply functioned to keep our
beliefs and desires consistent. For Hume, reason famously is
and ought to be the slave of the passions, and Mackie here takes
a similar view. This is no coincidence. Mackie makes it clear
both in the footnotes to Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong and in
Hume’sMoral Theory just how indebted he is toHume’s approach
here. I suspect that if Mackie had discussed practical rationality
in more detail that he would have also found traces of the error-
ridden notion of “objective value”, and urged us to excise that
from our discourse and “prune” our talk of rationality as well,
but that is admittedly a speculative hypothesis.
5. Conclusion
Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong has long been misun-
derstood. Mackie is not an error theorist in themodern sense; he
does not think allmoral discourse is riddled with error. Rather,
he thinks much and perhaps most ordinary moral discourse is
riddled with error, but that important pockets of ordinary moral
discourse are entirely in good working order. This explains how
he can go on, in the second half of the book, to make numerous
first-order moral claims, why he emphasizes the neutrality of his
second-order position from first-order ethics, etc. As it happens,
10See Schroeder (2007) for a recent defense of a view in this neighborhood.
Derek Parfit (1984) famously discusses the present aim theory.
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 8 no. 4 [17]
the pocket of ordinary moral discourse which is error free is
subjectivist in its content and amenable to a “hybrid theory” in
that the relevant judgments are partly constituted by endorsing
some contextually specified set of moral institutions. Mackie
thus should be understood as both a hybrid theorist and as a
“conceptual pruner”, urging us to do away with those strands of
moral thought and discourse which are indefensible.
Moberger made a reasonable initial case for this reading of
Mackie, but left out what I consider some of the strongest and
most direct evidence in its favour, relying instead too heavily on
indirect clues arising from caveats Mackie included in stating
the error theory. Most notably, the semantic pluralism needed
for this reading can be justified much more directly by attend-
ing to Mackie’s semantic theory for terms like “good”, “ought”,
“must”, and “reason”. That discussion also further corroborates
reading Mackie as a hybrid theorist, given his discussion of us-
ing “good” for “egocentric commendation”, as do passages from
Hume’s Moral Theory. Moreover, there is considerable additional
textual evidence for the view, some of it in other sources, and
it fits well with Mackie’s own account of the figures who most
influenced his thinking (Stevenson, Ayer, and especially Hume).
All of that said, the resulting view does face a challenge: to ex-
plain inwhat sense the reasonswe have for “remaking”morality
(in the narrow sense) are somehow “special”—why they have a
grip on us or “are normative”. I have argued that there is an
implicit answer to this in Mackie’s work, albeit a controversial
one. The reasons Mackie offers for reforming morality are pru-
dential, but prudence is not itself essentially rational. Rather, it
is grounded in the rationality of promoting the satisfaction of
one’s present desires and the contingent but deeply ingrained
and widespread desire most people have for their own future
welfare. Why rationality itself counts “as normative”, is of course
a further question, but here at least Mackie is in good company,
since theorists of many different stripes take the normativity of
rationality as a fundamental posit. Moreover, even if rationality
is not in any suitable sense normative, it is plausibly an essen-
tial feature of human nature, and so grounding his proposed
reforms in rationality should make the project philosophically
interesting to that extent.
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